COMMENTS AND NOTES
TRADEMARK LICENSING: THE
PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE CONTROL
The enactment of the Lanham Act in 1946 gave legislative
sanction to the practice of licensing trademarks for use by
persons other than the trademark owner. In granting this
approval, the Act required concomitantly that the trademark
owner "control" the natureand quality ofgoods produced by his
licensees and carrying his trademark. An examination of post1946 cases, however, reveals that some courts have upheld
licensing agreementsin which there was very little "control" and
that courts generally have failed to scrutinize diligently the
licensors' actual exercise of control. This comment seeks to
examine the manner in which courts have dealt with the Lanham
Act's "control" requirement and to explore the implications
which this hasfor the use of trademarks today.
most significant aspects of modern business advertising
and merchandising is the use of trademarks and brand names,
since a large percentage of American consumers rely on trademarks in
making purchasing decisions.' A key feature of trademarks, playing a
NE OF THE

determinative role in their extensive use and corresponding modern
economic importance, is trademark licensing.' Under a trademark
ISee Link, The Social Significance of Trademarks, 38 TRADEMARK REP. 622 (1948). in
which, on the basis of a 16 year study of consumer purchasing, the author concluded that from
70% to 95% of American consumers generally purchase on the basis of trademarks or brand
names. Although the importance of national trademarks may have diminished due to the growth
of local or "private" trademarks, more recent studies validate the importance of trademarks
generally. See Cunningham, Customer Loyalty to Store and Brand, 39 HARV. Bus. REV. 127
(Nov.-Dec. 1961). But see Lebow, Is the Trade-Mark Declining As a Marketing Tool? 40
TRADEMARK REP. 770

(1950).

Trademark licensing is an integral part of franchised operations, whereby a local
businessman may take advantage of the consumer demand for products connected with a wellknown symbol or name. See, e.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y.
1962), affd, 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964). The relatively recent development of widespread
interest in television personalities and similar characters has created a demand for products
connected with these characters and has thereby provided a fruitful market for entrepreneurs in a
wide variety of fields. See, e.g., Wyatt Earp Enterprises, Inc. v. Sackman, Inc., 157 F. Supp;
621, 624 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Bowman Gum, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 944,
948-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1952). The manufacturer of goods marked with an organizational emblem
2
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licensing arrangement, a party contracts with a trademark owner for

the use of the trademark, often in consideration for royalty payments.
Such an arrangement is advantageous to both parties,3 regardless of
whether the trademark is used by the licensee in connection with the
traditional product4 or is applied to a completely new product line.'
The trademark concept may be traced at least to medieval times,

6
when trademarks were an important part of the guild system.
Originally, a trademark was considered to signify the "source" of the
product to which it was attached,7 thus providing a means of

also profits from trademark licensing. See Future Farmers ofAmerica v. Romack, 114 F. Supp.
796, 797-98 (E.D. Ill. 1953), affd, 211 F.2d 925, 926 (7th Cir. 1954). Testimony given at a
Senate hearing indicates that the currently favorable view toward licensing, the ease of satisfying
control requirements, and the fact that licensing is largely dependent on private enforcement are
all elements contributing to the fact that litigation in this area is slight in comparison to the
actual number of licensing arrangements. Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in
Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 n.2 (1963).
3
A trademark owner who licenses the mark expands the notoriety of the mark and creates
additional sales possibilities as well as obtaining additional royalties. The party acquiring the
use of the mark gains the advantage of a symbol known to the public which already generates
considerable consumer demand. See Sage, Trade-Mark Licenses and Control, 43 TRADEMARK
REP. 675 (1953).
'See, e.g., Medd v. Boyd Wagner, Inc. 132 F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Ohio 1955) (ice cream
franchise); Arthur Murray, Inc. v. Horst, 110 F. Supp. 678 (D. Mass. 1953) (licensed dance
studio); Crown Beverage Corp. v. Nehi Corp., 196 Misc. 715, 92 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
(soft drink franchise).
' See, e.g., Bowman Gum, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 944, 948-49
(E.D.N.Y. 1952) (licensees used baseball player's name on various merchandise); Lone Ranger,
Inc. v. Currey, 79 F. Supp. 190, 192 (M.D. Pa. 1948) (same as to individual television character); Television Merchandising, Inc. v. Wee Classics, Inc., 136 N.Y.S.2d 902 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(licensees used television performers' names on clothing, toys and other products).
63 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS §§ 65-5.2 (2d ed.

1950) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN]. In the medieval guild economy, the mark was a
mandatory requirement on an artisan's goods enabling the guild to control the trade and to hold
accountable the producer of defective products. Id.; see Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social
Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB. 173 (1949). For a detailed examination
of the historical background of trademarks see F. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF THE LAW RELATING To TRADE-MARKS (1925).
7 CALLMANN §§ 65-5.2. While trademarks have

served a number of different functions of
varying importance in different historical periods, identification has been the classical function
which has molded the law of trademarks. Id. For many years, the courts continued to conceive
identification as the major function of the trademark. "The office of a trademark is to point out
distinctively the origin, or ownership of the article to which it is affixed; or, in other words, to
give notice who was the producer." Canal Co. v. Clark, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 311, 322 (187 1); see
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); Elgin Nat'l Watch Co. v.
Illinois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665, 673 (1901). Of course, the trademark itself serves not
only to protect the public, but to provide a means for an entrepreneur to capitalize on any "good
will" his business has created. Thus, both common law and statutory trademark rights and
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distinguishing between goods of similar appearance and enabling a

consumer to make an intelligent selection on the basis of prior
satisfaction Consumer purchasing conditioned upon previous
experience with an identifiable product in turn provided an incentive
for producers to maintain high quality standards.9 Under the
"source" theory, however, licensing of trademarks for another's use

was considerably limited, since it was crucial for the consumer to be
able to associate a trademarked product with its actual source'".

In the twentieth century, the "source theory" came under attack."
As an alternative, it was observed that the actual origin of a
trademarked product was unimportant to the consumer, to whom the

trademark signified only a standard of quality.

Consequently, the

central concept was that the trademark owner "guaranteed" that

his mark would appear only on goods of a certain quality and that
the consumer might safely rely on it as indicating a consistent

product quality level. To protect this reliance, the "guaranty"
theory requires that any trademark licensing arrangement provide

for control by the licensor sufficient to ensure the nature and quality
remedies are directed toward a dual purpose. See e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,
240 U.S. 403, 412-13 (1916). However, the protection of the public seems to be the more
dominant theme in the trademark cases, and it is this aspect of the trademark's purpose on
which this comment focuses.
I "[The trademark] must be designed, as its primary object and purpose, to indicate the owner
or producer of the commodity, and to distinguish it from like articles manufactured by others."
Columbia Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U.S. 460,463 (1893); see CAL1MANN §§ 65-5.2.
1Rogers, supra note 6, at 175-76, 180. If there were no means of distinguishing among goods
produced by different producers, a premium would be placed, not upon quality, but upon
manufacturing the cheapest goods possible or upon successfully imitating the appearance of
goods of high quality. Id. at 175-76.
" See, e.g., Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879); Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver
Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468,474-75 (8th Cir. 1901); Lea v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 139
F. 732 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1905); CALLMANN § 78.2.
"The source theory was attacked on the grounds that the consumer was not really concerned
with the actualsource or origin of the trademarked goods. Instead, it was maintained that the
consumer only assumes that goods with the same trademark reach him through the same
channels or emanate from the same "anonymous" source. Schechter, The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection,40 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1927).
"1lsaacs, Traffic in Trade-Symbols, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1210, 1215 (1931). The "guaranty"
ffinction did not spring full blown into the twentieth century as a completely new rationale for
the trademark. Instead, changes in the economic structure of society and the increased
impersonalization between producer and consumer made the guaranty function a more realistic
explanation of the meaning of a trademark to the consumer. CALLMANN § 65.2; see Pecheur
Lozenge Co. v. National Candy Co., 122 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds,
315 U.S. 666 (1942).
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of goods produced by the licensee.' 3 Thus, the- "guaranty". theory

allows broad licensing of trademarks,' 4 for so long as standardized
quality control is exercised, the number of actual sources should not
affect the public's ability to rely on a trademark. Recognizing the
value of expanded trademark licensing, Congress, by enacting the

Lanham Act in 1946,1 gave its approval to arrangements which
provide for control over the quality of the trademarked goods.

However, it appears that the courts in numerous instances have
failed to enforce adequately the control requirement by approving
licensing arrangements which lack sufficient control measures.
Furthermore, the control requirement seems to have been diluted by
judicial failure to inquire whether actual control is exercised over a

licensee, and by imposition of an unrealistic burden of proof on
litigants who challenge a trademark license. In order to evaluate the
substance and extent of such trends, this comment will examine

trademark licensing prior to the Lanham Act, the meaning of the
licensing provisions of the Act, and the licensing cases which have
arisen since its passage. The primary focus will concern the exercise of
adequate control by trademark licensors over their licensees and the

court's treatment of this issue.

"See, e.g., Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1959);
Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377, 378-79 (E.D. Pa. 1959); Joseph Bancroft
& Sons Co. v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 107 (E.D. Pa. 1958). But cf Woodward,
Some Observationson Legitimate Control of Nature and Quality of the Goods,49 TRADEMARK
REP. 609 (1959) (questioning the reasons for quality controls since the trademark owner himself
could make changes in quality, design, or formula). See also Trademark Licensing-Domestic
and Foreign, 51 TRADEMARK REP. 975 (1961) (reporting a simulated company management
decision on how to license a trademark).
The control requirement .is imposed on the licensor, who is the person most capable of
protecting the public from exposure to goods not of.the quality represented by his trademark.
See Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358,367 (2d Cir..1959).
NThe explication of the guaranty theoryas.a substitute for the source theory of trademarks is
particularly significant for trademark licensing. If the consumer's concern is with a quality
guarantee and not with specific identification, the owner of a trademark need not necessarily
participate in the production of the goods bearing his trademark. Instead, the owner may license
the use of the trademark and regulate or control the licensee without being directly involved in
production of the goods. See Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark
Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1177 (1963).
SLanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1964). The term "licensing" does not appear
specifically in the Act, but licensing is allowed under a provision providing for use by "related
companies," 15 U.S.C. § 1055 (1964), as that term is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). For
the terms of these provisions see text accompanying notes 76-77 infra.
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THE PRE-LANHAM ACT PERIOD

Prior to 1946 many states enacted laws providing for trademark
registration, but these laws proved inherently ineffective in
safeguarding trademarks in interstate business'" and, indeed, afforded
little protection even at the state level." While the Trademark Act of
190518 did provide some additional rights for a trademark registrant, 9
it contained no provision allowing the licensing of registered
trademarks, although trademark assignment in connection with the
transfer of a business' good will was permitted." Thus, prior to the
16Individual states could not, of course, extend their trademark laws outside of their own
jurisdictions. Indeed, the use of trademarks may be a subject demanding uniformity of
regulation upon which only Congress, and not the states, could legislate. See Diggins, Federal
and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.200,213-14 (1949); Fenning,
Trade Mark Act CongressionalReport, 17 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 120, 124-28, 133 (1935).
"The owner of a trademark generally could rely on an action of unfair competition to protect
his rights in the mark, but registration with a state provided no additional remedies, procedural
advantages in court, or other protections. Diggins, supra note 16, at 201; see Coca-Cola Co v.
Stevenson. 276 F. 1010. 1015-16 (S.D. Ill. 1920).
"Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724. An attempt to enact trademark legislation in the
nineteenth century had been defeated when the Supreme Court declared the statute
unconstitutional. The Court held that a trademark was not an "invention" to which Congress,
under Article I, could grant exclusive rights and also that the act did not attempt to limit its
coverage to interstate and foreign commerce. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
"1The benefits of the 1905 Act were procedural only, particularly in making access to the
federal courts available to the owner of a registered trademark. Substantive rights, however,
continued to be governed by the common law. Diggins, supra note 16, at 202; See 2 H. NIMs,
THE LAW OF UNFAIR CoMPETrrION AND TRADEMARKS § 223 (4th ed. 1947).
" Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, § 10, 33 Stat. 724. The assignment provision was merely a
restatement of the common law position. Trademarks were considered to be a representation of
any "good will" that a business might have generated. Thus, when the business was sold to
another, it was natural for the trademark to accompany it. There was no danger of deception of
the public since the mark would continue to be used in relation to the goods with which it had
previously been connected. See, e.g., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,413-14
(1916); Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75 (8th Cir.

1901).
Doubts may be raised about the distinction between the well-accepted practice of assignment
of a trademark in connection with the "good will" of a business, and the practice, which was
often disapproved, of licensing another person to use a trademark while the original owner
continued to use the same trademark in his own business. It would appear that in either case the
"new" person using the trademark would have an opportunity to dilute the quality of the goods
associated with the trademark and thereby deceive the public. See Taggart, Trade-Marks and
Related Companies: A New Concept in Statutory Trade-Mark Law, 14 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 234, 235 (1949). However, if the trademark were completely assigned to another, any
change in quality would be uniform and the public could either accept the new quality level or
reject the product. A licensing arrangement, however, does permit varying quality levels within
the standard expected by the public.
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Lanham Act, trademark licensing was governed largely by the
2

common law. '
The common law rule respecting the assignment or licensing of
trademarks was well stated in the case of Macmahan PharmacalCo.
v. Denver Chemical Manufacturing Co. 2 The Macmahan Company
had contracted to allow use of the trademark, "antiphlogistine," on
the licensee's medical product. The contract required that Macmahan

protect the licensee from any infringement by other parties, and
Macmahan brought the suit against Denver to enjoin the using of the

trademark on Denver's product..23 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit held Macmahan's contract invalid, noting that "[a]
trademark cannot be assigned or its use licensed, except as incidental

to a transfer of the business or property in connection with which it
has been used."

4

Thus, not only had the licensee acquired no

enforceable trademark rights under the contract, but Macmahan, by
participating in a scheme which deceived the public as to the source of

the trademarked product, was not entitled to equitable relief against
Denver's use of the trademark. 25 The requirement that the trademark
continue to be associated with its related business was a logical

consequence of the "source" theory of trademarks, for only in this
way could a consumer properly associate trademarked goods with
their actual origin."

The Macmahan rule was followed by a number of courts which
invalidated agreements licensing the use of a trademark without an
"See. e.g.. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413-14 (1916); Kidd v,
Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 620 (1879); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); Macmahan
Pharmacal Co. v. Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 474-75 (8th Cir. 1901); Independent
Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448, 451-54 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910).
2 113 F. 468 (8th Cir. 1901).
3 There were actually three

products involved in the case. Macmahan itself applied the term
"antiphlogistine" to a liquid dentrifice, and both the licensee and Denver used the name on a
plastic compound used to reduce external inflammation. Id. at 474.
"Id.at 474-75. The court suggested that the issue was not one of the quantity or percentage of
the business to be transferred, so long as the trademark continued to be associated with the
business enterprise or property with which it had previously been associated. See note 30 infra.
As the licensee had formerly been a stockholder and president of Denver and definitely knew of
its product, the court may well have been influenced by the possibility of an attempt by the
licensee to defraud Denver. 113 F. at 474-75.
"Id. at 475-76. In addition to determining that the licensing agreement was invalid, the court
found that Macmahan itself had not sufficiently used the trademark so as to acquire trademark
rights. Id. at 473-74. Thus, it would appear that Denver could have successfully restrained the
use of the mark by both Macmahan and its licensee.
" See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
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accompanying transfer of the related business interest. Thus, the use
of a trade name by locally-franchised teachers' agencies under the
supervision of the trade name's owner was held invalid.2 7 The court
found that the local agencies were separate businesses connected with
the trade name owner only by contract and ruled that, by allowing
such businesses to use the name, the owner had abandoned his right to
protection of the name. 28 Similarly, a baking powder firm which had

acquired the use of a trademark from a company continuing in
business was not allowed to restrain the use of the trademark by
another.29 The deciding tribunal reasoned that the owner of the
trademark could not license another to use his mark while he
continued to produce the same product under a different name.3 0

While the rule that a valid transfer of a trademark must be
accompanied by the transfer of the "business" or its "good will,"
", Everett 0.

Fisk & Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7 (8th Cir. 1924). The name

"Fisk Teachers' Agency" was first used in a local operation and gradually expanded to other
cities. Fisk allowed these other local agencies to use the name and included the local agency in
his advertising, in exchange for which the local agency paid royalties and agreed to operate
subject to Fisk's direction in its relation to the other agencies. One of the local agencies
subsequently repudiated the contract, but continued to operate under the Fisk name. Fisk sued
to enjoin the use of the name, but the court denied relief. Id. at 7-8. See American Broadcasting
Co. v. Wahl Co., 121 F.2d 412,413 (2d Cir. 1941).
13 F.2d at 8-9. By improperly licensing a trademark, a trademark owner may be considered
to have "abandoned" his trademark rights to the general public. See note 83 infra.
29Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175 F. 448 (C.C.D.N.J. 1910). The dispute
was over the use of the word "Solar" on baking powder. The complainant had allegedly
obtained the use of the word from an individual who had acquired it from the original developer
of the name, and the complainant sued to enjoin its use by the defendant. The court held that
the complainant had improperly acquired the mark because the original developer had purported to transfer only the name "Solar" while remaining in the business of making baking
powder under another name. Id. at 449-51; see Atlas Beverage Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing
Co., 113 F.2d 672, 677-78 (8tfh Cir. 1940); Dietz v. Horton Mfg. Co., 170 F. 865, 870-71
(6th Cir. 1909); Bultev. Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1905).
" Thus, because the owner could not validly license the trademark under these circumstances,
the licensee had no trademark rights to enforce. 175 F. at 451-54. In noting that a trademark
could only be transferred in connection with the good will of the business itself, the court noted
that it was not a matter of "decimal fractions" of the business which needed to be transferred.
Id. at 453-54.
In Lea v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 139 F. 732 (C.C.E.D.N.Y. 1905), the plaintiff, who
had previously sold sewing machines under the name "National" and had established a market
for them, subsequently licensed the defendant to sell the latter's machines under the "National"
name. When the defendant refused to pay the agreed royalties, the plaintiff sued. The court
denied relief, however, holding that a trademark owner could not grant a licensee the right to use
the mark unless the owner himself participated in the production or inspection of the product.
Id; cf. Nisley Shoe Co. v. Nisley Co., 72 F.2d 118, 120 (6th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 293
U.S. 602 (1934).
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was frequently applied, it was never clearly delineated. Because the
courts were evidently not concerned with mechanical formulas or

percentages and wished to treat each case individually, no specific
guidelines were established as to the nature or quantity of the

"business" which had to be transferred.' However, it seems clear that
the courts, relying on the "source" theory of trademarks,3 2 were

attempting to prevent consumer deception by requiring that
trademarked goods come from the source with which the consumer
33
associated them .
In spite of the Macmahan rule, licensing of trademarks was

permitted in numerous situations in which the transfer of a business
interest was not the crucial factor. Instead, the courts were willing to

sustain trademark licensing contracts where a certain amount of
control over the licensee was retained by the trademark owner. 34 Such
control over the nature and quality of the licensee's product was felt to
be an adequate means of protecting consumer reliance on the
trademark.35 Frequently, trademark licensing was sanctioned where
the licensor supplied raw materials to the licensee, the most notable
"1See note 30 supra. Because the important point was that the trademark continue to be
associated with the "business" which had previously utilized it, a requirement that a certain
percentage of a business be transferred, clearly would be misplaced. In some instances it might
be necessary to transfer the entire business operation, while in others a small portion ol the
total business would be sufficient.
" See notes 7-10 supra add accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Everett 0. Fisk &Co. v. Fisk Teachers' Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 9 (8th Cir. 1924);
Bulte v. Igleheart Bros., 137 F. 492, 498-99 (7th Cir. 1905); Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v.
Denver Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1901). As long as a court relied on the
"source" theory of trademarks, it would be extremely difficult for it to sustain the licensing of
trademarks, since usually the licensee would not be identified as being the actual source of the
product. However, at least one court indicated that the real issue was not necessarily one of
source, but one of control. See Lea v. New Home Sewing Mach. Co., 139 F. 732 (C.C.E.D.N.Y.
1905).
'4 See Shniderman, Trade-Mark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasy and Fact, 14 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 248, 252-59 (1949); Taggart, Trade-Marks and Related Companies:A New
Concept in Statutory Trade-Mark Law, 14 LAW & CONThMP. PRoB. 234, 236-41 (1949); Note,
Trade Mark Law-Valid Use of Trade Marks By Other Than Owner, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. Rv.
483, 488-89 (1948). But see Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark
Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171, 1185 (1963).
"As indicated in note 33 supra, a court which strictly followed the "source" theory of
trademarks was not likely to approve of trademark licensing. The number of cases involving
licensing which were approved can best be explained by recognizing that the "Macmahan rule"
was honored as much in the breach as in the observance, and that some courts recognized the
rationale of the "guaranty" theory. See notes 11-13 supra. Although the guaranty function
seems not to have been articulated in most cases, the function was occasionally recognized. See,
e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. Saniwax Paper Co., 26 F.2d 941 (W.D. Mich. 1928).
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instances involving the Coca-Cola Company.16 Coca-Cola entered
into contracts to supply the syrup base to local franchised dealers who

bottled the drink subject to substantial rights of control by CocaCola? 7 In granting Coca-Cola an injunction against an unautho-

rized bottler, the court pointed out that the right to bottle the
drink was a right Coca-Cola could grant to others" and that an
injunction was necessary to prevent the destruction of the trademark's
value. 9 In these cases the courts did not examine whether the
" See Coca-Cola

Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916), rev'g 225 F. 429 (D. Kan. 1915);

Coca-Cola Co. v. Gay-Ola Co., 200 F. 720 (6th Cir. 1912), cert. denied, 229 U.S. 613 (1913);
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796 (D. Del. 1920); Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G.
Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916); Coca-Cola Co. v. Deacon Brown Bottling Co., 200
F. 105 (N.D. Ala. 1912); cf.Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 153 (1940).
11Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916), rev'g 225 F. 429 (D. Kan. 1915). The
Coca-Cola Company licensed two "parent" bottling companies, which in turn licensed local
bottlers in their respective areas. Each local bottler received the syrup base and the right to bottle
the beverage under trademark upon agreeing to prepare the beverage by adding a certain
proportion of carbonated water, and agreeing not to add any unauthorized substances or to label
any other drink with the Coca-Cola trademark. Moreover, the Company retained a right of
inspection and supervision over the bottling of the beverage. Id. at 514-15.
" The court did not attempt to distinguish or harmonize the cases following the "Macmahan
rule." It seemed to assume that the proposition that Coca-Cola could license bottler and the use
of the trademark was uncontroverted. Of course, the case may be analyzed on the basis that a
business interest, i.e., bottling, was being transferred; but the court made no such analysis. Id. at
516. But see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 806-08 (D. Del. 1920)
(sustaining trademark rights on the ground that there had been a transfer of the bottling portion
of the business in connection with the trademark).
" "Control" by Coca-Cola was the only way that the company and, by implication, the public
could be protected. Thus, the court placed considerable emphasis on the need of the company to
supervise the bottling of the product, which, of course, it could not do, since it had no contract
with the defendant. 238 F. at 516-17; see Coca-Cola Co. v. J. G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224,
230-31 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
The manufacturing of clothing from trademarked textiles was another area where trademark
licensing was sustained. In B. B. & R. Knight, Inc. v. W. L. Milner & Co., 283 F. 816 (N.D. Ohio
1922), the owner of the "Fruit of the Loom" trademark sought to enjoin the defendant, an
unauthorized user of the mark, from selling shirts under this name. The owner's system of
licensing, under which manufacturers who used the owner's cotton cloth also were allowed to use
the trademark, was not directly challenged; but in establishing the owner's right to equitable
relief, the court emphasized the care with which the trademark had been protected by its owner
in selecting manufacturers of high standing who were willing to guarantee the product along
with him and to refund the price of the goods upon customer dissatisfaction. Id. at 817; cf.
Finchley, Inc. v. George Hess Co., 24 F. Snlpp. 94, 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1938); H. Freeman & Son v. F.
C. Huyck & Son, 7 F. Supp. 971 (N.D.N.Y. 1934). In Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose Corp., 145 F.2d 246 (C.C.P.A. 1944), Crown Fabric's application to register "Crown" as
a trademark was successfully opposed by American Viscose. The court sustained the decision,
holdinj that American" Viscose had not forfeited its trademark rights due to its licensing of
others to use the mark on goods made from materials supplied by American Viscose. The court
noted that not only did American Viscose require the testing by an independent fabrics bureau of
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Macmahan requirement of transferring a business interest had been

satisfied. Instead, their approval of the trademark licensing rested on
the assumption that since the trademark owner supplied the basic

material and exerted supervision over the production, there was little
danger of the public mistakenly buying inferior goods. 0
Courts also validated licensing agreements in which the trademark

was licensed along with the licensing of a patent. Thus, a patentee of a
water heater who licensed another to use his patent and its trademark,

but reserved the right to cancel the contract if unauthorized changes
were made, did not forfeit his trademark rights by the licensing and
later was permitted to enjoin the former licensee from using the
mark. 4 The underlying theory of the patent cases seemed to be that
because the trademark continued to be associated with its traditional
product and the patentee was able to supervise the proper use of the
42
patent, no problem of public deception was likely to arise.

Trademark licensing contracts also withstood judicial scrutiny
where the licensor owned stock in the licensee's business. For example,

a maple syrup company which granted the right to use its trademark
to another company in which it owned one-half the capital stock was
held to have retained its trademark rights and not to have released

them to its controlled licensee.43 Similarly, a holding company
all fabrics made from its rayon yarn, but it had sole control over the use of labels and advertising
bearing the trademark. Id. at 247.
4' The focus in the cases is clearly on the steps taken by the licensor to insure that the quality of
the trademarked product was maintained. Generally, there is no attempt to analyze the licensing
situation in terms of a transfer of a business interest. See cases cited in notes 36-39 supra. But
see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 269 F. 796, 806-808 (D. Del. 1920).
"' Adam v. Folger, 120 F. 260 (7th Cir. 1903). Subsequent to licensing the patent, the patent
owner revoked the license and sued for infringement of the patent and trademark when the
licensee made unauthorized changes in the water heater. Id. at 261. Noting that the trademark
represented to the public not that the heater was manufactured by a particular person, but only
that it was the kind covered by the patent, the court held that the trademark licensing was a
natural consequence of the patent licensing. Id. at 264; see Hoffman v. B. Kuppenheimer & Co.,
183 F. 597 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1910). In Smith v. Dental Products Co., 140 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 322 U.S. 743 (1944), the court, observing that the dentist had not abandoned his
trademarks to the defendant by licensing them, emphasized the control which the dentist
continued to exercise over the production and sale of the equipment, including the spending of
considerable time at the manufacturing plant. Id. at 147.
42Although under the theory of the patent cases the product no longer originated from the
actual source, the trademark was associated with the traditional product. Moreover, there was
little likelihood of a diminution of quality since the patentee continued to exercise "control" by
supervising the licensee's operations or by exercising a right of revocation when unauthorized
changes were made.
'" Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F.N. Johnson Maple Syrup Co., 272 F. 478 (D. Vt. 1921).
Actually, the court only mentioned the stock ownership and placed its entire emphasis on the
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subsidiary allowed other subsidiaries which were also under the
holding company's general control to use its trademark on a certain

type of cracker, and in a suit to enjoin another company's use of the
trademark, the subsidiary's rights were upheld and an injunction
granted.4 The courts' implied justification for sustaining these
licenses seemed to be that stock ownership and certain control
measures ensured that the licensor would continue to control the

quality of goods produced under its trademark.45
Approval was also given to trademark licensing agreements which

authorized American companies to use a mark while serving as
exclusive sales representatives of foreign companies. Thus, the
American sales representative of textile belting made by a British
corporation was held to have a "special ownership" in the
accompanying trademark with the right to register it and receive

protection.

While cases in this area may have involved a "business

transfer," the sounder basis for upholding the agreement seems to be
that the trademark licensor produced the goods, reducing the
47
possibility of the licensee's diminishing the quality.
fact that the agreement provided that the license was at will and could be revoked by the licensor
at any time. Thus, the trademark owner had extensive "control" over the use of his trademark.
Id.
" Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J. S. Ivins' Son, 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934). The court
noted that all the subsidiaries were controlled by the United Biscuit Company with respect to
sales methods and manufacturing. Also, the subsidiary which had originally owned the
trademark had participated in establishing the manufacturing methods in other subsidiaries'
plants. Id. at 213-14.
11In the Keebler case, id., the court relied on the relation of the companies to infer that there
would be a uniform quality product produced by the subsidiaries, but some attention was given
to methods of actual control. In Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F. N. Johnson Maple Syrup Co.,
272 F. 478 (D. Vt. 1921), the emphasis was clearly on the ability of the licensor to terminate the
relationship quickly and thus to control the licensee.
46 Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works of America, Inc., 257 F. 937, 955-56
(2d Cir.), cert. denied,250 U.S. 644 (1919); see Lalanne v. F. R. Arnold & Co., 39 F.2d 269, 271
(C.C.P.A. 1930) (American company distributed French company's cosmetics); cf. American
Dirigold Corp. v. Dirigold Metals Corp., 125 F.2d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 1942).
7Admittedly, the courts did not specifically use a "control" rationale for their decisions.
Furthermore, there is considerable discussion of the need for a trademark to be associated with a
business, see, e.g., Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos & Rubber Works of America, Inc., 257
F. 937, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 644 (1919). However, there is reason to believe that
the courts felt that no problem of public deception would arise in these situations both because of
the licensor's production and because there was only one domestic source with which the public
might associate the product. It seems, too, that it would be possible for the American company
to manufacture the product, not just distribute it, because there would still be only one uniform
quality product with which American consumers would associate the trademark.

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 1968: 875

Many of the pre-Lanham Act cases sustaining trademark

licensing agreements can be explained on a transfer of a business
interest basis, thus fitting them within a broad interpretation of the
Macmahan rule.48 However, judicial failure to attempt to harmonize
them with Macmahan implies that courts basically were not enforcing
the "rule" of that case. Instead, believing that the public need only be
protected as to the quality of the goods, these courts approved
licensing arrangements which provided for sufficient "control" over

the licensee to ensure such quality. 49 Regardless of the rationale
utilized, however, it is evident that some licensing of trademarks was

judicially permitted prior to the Lanham Act.5 0
Even though trademark licensing arrangements in a number of
contexts received judicial protection from infringement before the
Lanham Act, it remained difficult to secure registration of such
marks under the 1905 Trademark Act." Under the decision of the

Commissioner of Patents in the United States Steel case,52 a company
could not register a trademark if it sought to establish the necessary
requisite of "use" 3 of the trademark by showing "use" by licensees.
United States Steel sought to register a trademark which was being
used by its subsidiary companies,5 4 but the application was denied, the

Commissioner holding that United States Steel itself must use the
41 For example, when Coca-Cola licensed local bottlers, they were arguably transferring the
"bottling business" along with the trademark. Similarly, a subsidiary of a larger company might
be operating part bf a total business operation to which a trademark could attach. See Note,
Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1172, 1185
(1963).
" See, e.g., Smith v. Dental Products Co., 140 F.2d 140 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 743
(1944); Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916), rev'g 225 F.429 (D. Kan. 1915);
Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose Corp., 145 F.2d 246 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
"0See notes 34-35 supra and accompanying text.
5"Although the advantages of registration under the 1905 Act were not extensive, there was
some incentive to register a trademark. The main advantage was the right of a registrant to
obtain access to the federal courts without meeting diversity of citizenship requirements, See
note 19 supra.
"United States Steel Corp., 23 U.S.P.Q. 145 (Comm'r 1934).
It is an elementary tenet of trademark law that ownership rights in a trademark only arise
out of the actual use of the mark. Therefore, before a person can register a mark (or establish his
right to equitable protection of the mark), he must establish that he has sufficiently used the
mark so as to give rise to rights in it. Eg., Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403,
413 (1916); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879); Macmahan Pharmacal Co. v. Denver
Chem. Mfg. Co., 113 F. 468,471-72 (8th Cir. 1901).
"Although the subsidiaries were actually using the trademark, U.S. Steel alleged that it was
the "owner" of the mark because it owned substantially all the stock of the subsidiaries. 23
U.S.P.Q. at 146.
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trademark before it could claim trademark rights." This decision
created a dichotomous situation in that a trademark owner who had
licensed its use by a controlled subsidiary might receive protection for
the mark in an infringement suit, but he could not register the mark
with the Patent Office because under United States Steel he was not
the "owner" of the mark.16 The Commissioner himself recognized
that the advantages to both licensor and licensee in allowing such a
registration were obvious, 57 but he held that the 1905 Trademark Act
did not permit such a registration. 8 Thus, the United States Steel
decision, by pointing up the Act's deficiencies, was instrumental in
spurring the drive for new trademark legislation. 9
THE LANHAM ACT

Underlying both the trademark revision movement and the
resulting Lanham Act was the premise that American businessmen
and the public generally would benefit from a comprehensive statute
which would simplify trademark registration and make it more
readily available.6" Accordingly, the Act attempted to encourage
registration by providing a registrant with advantages unavailable
under common law, including access to the federal courts without
meeting normal jurisdictional requirements,6' general incontestability
of the trademark after five years of continuous use,62 and registration
as prima facie evidence of a mark's validity and the registrant's rights
11The Commissioner denied U.S. Steel's allegation as to ownership, holding that in spite of
the stock ownership, the subsidiaries were separate legal entities. Therefore, the Company had
no rights in the trademark. Id. at 147. The Commissioner distinguished Keebler Weyl Baking
Co. v. J. S. Ivins' Son, 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934), on the ground that, in that case, the
subsidiary itself was claiming ownership of the mark and that registration rights were not
involved. Id. at 147-48.
11The dichotomy was not absolute, however. Under the decision there would be no bar to a
company registering a mark if that company, as well as licensees, used the mark. Also, a
company which had licensed its trademark might receive no protection of the mark if a
court followed the Macmahan rule. See note 24 supra and accompanying text.
s See note 19 supraand accompanying text.
23 U.S.P.Q. at 147-48.
9See note 66 infra and accompanying text.
"S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see Ooms, How the Lanham Act Affects
Trademarks, 37 TRADEMARK REP. 383 (1947). For a general legislative history of the Lanham
Act see Schniderman, supra note 34, at 249-52 (1949); Taggart, supra note 34, at 241-42 (1949);
Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171,
1181-82 (1963).
61 15 U.S.C. § 1121 (1964).
61Id. at § 1065.
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to its use.63 Furthermore, the Act provided that marks which were
being used through licensing arrangements could be registered as part

of a "related company" situation.64
However, the changes in the trademark law with regard to
licensing were not quickly achieved, the first attempts dating back to
1938 when a House bill provided that the use of registered trademarks
by companies subsidiary or related to the registrant should affect
neither the validity of the mark nor its registrability.65 Although much

of the debate on the bill indicated that its primary purpose was to
overturn the United States Steel decision,66 there was sentiment

favoring expansion of the "related companies" provision to include
arrangements beyond that of parent and subsidiary. Thus, the 1939

bill defined a "related company" as one in which the nature and
quality of its products were controlled by "stock ownership,
contractual relationship, or otherwise, '"" clearly allowing

relationships other than parent and subsidiary to qualify as that of a
"related company."

6

Id. at § 1057(b).
"Id. at §§ 1055, 1127. The entire discussion of licensing throughout the legislative history of the Act is in terms of "related companies." See Taggart, supra note 34; notes 76-78
infra and accompanying text.
65H.R. 9041, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). The 1938 bill did not define a "related company,"
and a brief submitted by the U.S. Trademark Association suggested doing so to make clear the
"apparent object" of the bill-to allow a parent company to apply for registration where the
"ownership" of the mark was shared with subsidiaries. Hearings on H.R. 9041 Before the
Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on Patents, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 65 (1938)
[hereinafter cited as 1938 Hearings].
66See notes 52-58 supra. Mr. Rogers, head of the ABA committee on trademarks
improvement, and "expert" on the bill, testified that the "related companies" section was
designed "to meet the very situation" then existing in the law, that an applicant for registration
could not rely on use by a subsidiary or related company. He referred to the United States Steel
decision as an example of a case which could be overruled by the provision. 1938 Hearings at
136.
67The brief of the U.S. Trademark Association noted it was "strongly in favor" of permitting
the assignment of marks for a part of the business, or without any partial transfer of the business
if the owner retainedsufficient control. 1938 Hearings at 65. Mr. Rogers noted that the related
company section was designed to include a holding company which did not engage in
manufacturing, but licensed or assigned to other companies its trademark rights. Id. at 135-36.
There was also support for an express trademark licensing provision, using the British
trademark statute as an example. Id. at 159-66. Finally, the bill was amended in committee
hearings to provide that a registered trademark might be used by members of an association, in
addition to subsidiary or related companies. Id. at 134-37.
11H.R. 4744,76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939).
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In spirited debate during the hearings,69 opponents of this
provision argued that licensors might fail to control their "related
company" licensees, and the resulting diminution of quality would
destroy the public's faith in trademarks.70 Proponents, on the other
hand, maintained that no company would commit "commercial
suicide" by allowing inferior goods to be marketed under its
trademark, that proof of control was mandatory before a trademark
could be registered, and that controlled licensing had proved a
success-as evidenced by Coca-Cola.' Although passed by the House
in 1939, the bill failed in the Senate." Final action on the measure was
forestalled for several years due to the inability of the two houses to
agree on an identical bill 73 and the opposition of the Justice
Department, which feared the legislation would hamper the antitrust
laws; 74 and it was 1946 before the Lanham Act finally became
law.7"
As enacted, Section 5, on "related companies," provides:
Where a registered mark or a mark sought to be registered is or
may be used legitimately by related companies, such use shall inure to the benefit of the registrant or applicant for registration, and
such use shall not affect the validity of such mark or of its registraHearings on H.R. 4744 Before the Subcomm. on Trade-Marks of the House Comm. on
Patents, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. (1939) [hereinafter cited as 1939 Hearings].
101939 Hearingsat 58-59.
"11939 Hearings at 60. In response to questions, Mr. Rogers indicated that the provision
made control over a related company mandatory before a registrant could claim the benefit of
use by the related company.
" The Senate Committee on Patents made several changes including language to the effect
that control over the nature and quality of the goods was to be exercised by the registrant. 86
CoNG. REC. 8990, 8993 (1940). This reference to the actual exercise of control, which seems to
mean that mere power to control would be insufficient, appeared in the 1941 House bill, but it
subsequently was deleted. The Senate also added a provision that the trademark was not to be
used so as to deceive the public. Id. at 8990. However, final passage was prevented by a motion
to reconsider. Id. at 8993.
IIn 1941 and 1942 the House and Senate considered bills substantially the same as the 1939
Senate version. Hearings on H.R. 102, H.R. 5461, and S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on TradeMarks of the House Comm. on Patents, 77th Cong., IstSess. (1941). The Senate did actually
pass a bill in 1941, 87 CONG. REC. 7445 (1941), but the House did not. When the House did
act in 1942, 88 CONG.REC. 7431, 7437 (1942), the bill was unlike the Senate version.
71Hearingson H.R. 82 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Patents, 78th Cong., 2d
Sess. 63-152 (1944); 90 CONG. REC. 9430, 9439 (1944). The word "legitimately" was added to
the section on use by related companies in the 1946 bill to satisfy the antitrust opponents. H.R.
1654,79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946); see Shniderman, supranote 34, at 251-52 (1949).
1192 CONG. REC. 7522,7525 (1946); S.REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1946).
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tion, provided such mark is not used in such manner as to deceive
the public.1

6

A "related company" is defined in section 45:
The term "related company" means any person who legitimately
controls or is controlled by the registrant or applicant for registration in respect to the nature and quality of the goods or services in
connection with which the mark is used."

The consequence of these sections is to recognize the validity of the
previously existing practice of licensing and to allow trademark
owners operating under such licensing agreements to register their
marks.7 8 The definition of a "related company," moreover, definitely
encompasses situations beyond that of United States Steel. 9
In approving trademark licensing, it seems that Congress relied on
previous judicial decisions and adopted the "guaranty" theory of
trademarks." Under both the theory and the Act, a valid licensing
agreement was specifically conditioned on the licensor's controlling
the nature and quality of his licensees' goods," a condition which
serves a dual function under the Act. On the one hand, a licensor who
adequately controls his licensees can meet the definition of a "related
company" under section 5 and may register the trademark.' 2 On the
other hand, a failure to exercise sufficient control over the nature and
quality of a licensee's goods may constitute an "abandonment" of the
trademark and result in cancellation of registration." Furthermore,
7115 U.S.C. § 1055 (1964). "Collective marks," those used by unions or cooperatives such as

the Future Farmers of America, and "certification marks," denoting regional or other origin
(e.g., "Idaho potatoes"), are both protected under § 4 of the Act if the registrant exercises
"legitimate control" over their use. Id. § 1054.
11Id. § 1127 (emphasis added).
"See C. B. Donald Co., 117 U.S.P.Q. 485 (Comm'r 1958); Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. 19
(Comm'r 1953) (dictum); Developments in the Law-Trademarks and Unfair Competition, 68
HARV. L. REV. 814, 871 (1955); Note, Trade Mark Law- Valid Use of Trade Mark by Other
than Owner, 23 N.Y.U.L.Q. REy. 482,488-89 (1948).
"See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
" There were no extensive presentations of case law either for or against trademark licensing,
but discussion during the hearings indicates that the litigation had made known the existence of
previous trademark licensing. See 1939 Hearings at 58-59. While the "guaranty" theory of
trademarks seems not to have been adverted to by name, the proposed changes with regard to
licensing definitely were based on this newer theory. See 1938 Hearings at 147, 158; 1939
Hearingsat 80-81.
"' See notes 69-70 supra and accompanying text.
S2 See notes 76-77 supra and accompanying text.
' "Abandonment" is grounds for cancellation under 15 U.S.C. § 1064(c) (1964). One of the
definitions of "abandonment" is conduct of the registrant "including acts of omission as well as
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since Congress chose to rely on licensor control rather than actual
source in order to prevent public deception, it seems clear that a
licensor's mere inclusion of a control provision in the contract would
be inadequate. Thus, to secure registration of the mark, a trademark
owner who allows the mark to be used by his licensees must exercise
control over the nature and quality of the goods produced by the
licensees under his trademark.84 However, the Act specified neither the
degree of control required nor the extent to which the courts should
examine the issue.85

commission, [which] causes the mark to lose its significance as an indication of origin." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1964). Uncontrolled licensing may be such an abandonment. See Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963); American Foods, Inc. v.
Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1963); Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food
Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1958); Annot., 3 A.L.R.2d 1226 (1949). The theory
behind the "abandonment" concept is that when others are allowed to use a trademark without
control, the mark comes to denote only the article involved and the name becomes public
property and may be used by anyone making the article. See Everett 0. Fisk & Co. v. Fisk
Teachers' Agency, Inc., 3 F.2d 7, 8 (8th Cir. 1924).
" See Lahart, Control-The Sine Qua Non of a Valid Trademark License, 50 TRADEMARK
REP. 103, 107-08 (1960); Shniderman, Trademark Licensing-A Saga of Fantasyand Fact, 14
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 248, 264 (1949); Wehringer, Trademark Licenses: Control Provided,
Control Exercised,47 TRADEMARK REP. 287, 298-99 (1957). See note 72 supra.
Theoretically, a licensor's interest in maintaining the value of his trademark would make it
unnecessary to impose any control requirement,as the licensor would control his licensees out of
his own self-interest. Although this is undoubtedly the case in many instances, there are several
possibilities mitigating against this "natural" control. A licensor may encounter difficulty in
policing his licensees and, unless there is a threat of losing his trademark rights, he may elect not
to enforce control-at least against some of the licensees. Similarly, if there are a large number
of licensees, the burden of control may be considered to be too great. Finally, there undoubtedly
will be licensors who would capitalize on short-term exploitation of a trademark's value,
ignoring any possible long-range adverse effects of inadequate control.
" As the legislative history indicates, the exact form or nature of "control" was never clearly
delineated, which suggests that any of several measures might suffice depending on the
circumstances of the particular trademark and business involved. Similarly, as was the case
with the "business transfer" requirement in certain pre-Lanham Act cases, see note 31 supra
and accompanying text, no specific "amount" of control could be specified. This may be
contrasted with the fairly definite meaning of "control" in other contexts. For example, "control" of a corporation for tax purposes exists with ownership of stock possessing at least 80
percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of voting stock and at least 80 percent
of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 368(c).
Also, under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, a company is presumed to be a
holding company if it owns 10 percent of the voting securities of a public utility company. 15
U.S.C. § 79b(a)(7) (1964); see 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 764-83 (2d ed. 1961). The
"control" exercised by corporate "insiders" is regulated by the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, an "insider" being defined as one who has the beneficial ownership of more than 10 percent of any registered equity security. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1964).
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THE POST-LANHAM ACT PERIOD 6

As a review of its legislative history suggests, the Lanham Act in
sanctioning trademark licensing merely reflected congressional
approval of an already established business practice. 7 It is not
surprising, therefore, that many trademark licensing arrangements
judicially upheld after 1946 were substantially similar to licenses
approved prior to the Act.88 Thus, the bottling of soft drink beverages
under licensing agreements was sustained,"9 an American distributor
of products made by a foreign company was permitted to use that
company's trademark, 0 the licensing of a trademark in connection
with the transfer of a patented secret formula received judicial
approval, 9' and a licensing contract was upheld where a licensee had

common corporate officers with the trademark owner.9" These cases,
while evidently adhering to the concept of "control" as the crucial

element in a valid licensing agreement, provided little guidance in
determining the type of control required and the extent to which the
courts should examine the issue of adequate control.
Seeking to resolve the question of the Lanham Act's control
requirements for a valid trademark license, the Commissioner of
"6
Since the enactment of the Lanham Act there appears to be more judicial decisions on
trademark licensing, although such decisions still probably represent a small part of actual
licensing. See note 2 supra. The subject of licensing has also received increased attention from
commentators. See, e.g., Shniderman, supra note 84; Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust
Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171 (1963).
See notes 34 &35 supraand accompanying text.

"The cases seldom refer to the earlier comparable cases, particularly since the licensing
arrangements were not always the direct items of controversy. However, it seems that the fact
that licensing had been approved in like situations before the Lanham Act, would provide some
rationale for approval of later cases. The situations would still have to meet a "control" test,
however, and some of the cases are subject to the same objection of failure to look into actual
control. See notes 120-22 infra and accompanying text.
89
Compare Jones v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 223 F. Supp. 650 (D. Neb. 1963) (by implication),
Dad's Root Beer Co. v. Doe's Beverages, Inc., 94 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1950), afjd, 193 F.2d
77 (2d Cir. 1951) and Crown Beverage Corp. v. Nehi Corp., 196 Misc. 715, 92 N.Y.S.2d 902
(Sup. Ct. 1949) (latter two cases not decided under Lanham Act), with Coca-Cola Co. v.
Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir. 1916), rev'g 225 F. 429 (D. Kan. 1915).
90Compare Browne-Vintners Co. v. National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 151 F. Supp. 595
(S.D.N.Y. 1957), with Scandinavia Belting Co. v. Asbestos &Rubber Works of America, Inc.,
257 F. 937 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,250 U.S. 644 (1919).
1,
Compare Pickren v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 560 (N.D. Fla. 1965) (by implication),
affd, 378 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1967), with Adam v. Folger, 120 F. 260 (7th Cir. 1903).
92 Compare Clover Farm Stores Corp., 118 U.S.P.Q. 110 (Comm'r 1958), with Keebler Weyl
Baking Co. v. J.S.Ivins' Son, 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
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Patents stated in a 1958 registration proceeding93 that section 5 of the
Act did not change the earlier general decisional law 94 and was mainly
designed to change the result of United States Steel, not to establish a
system of unlimited licensing. As a consequence, any applicant to

register a mark who relied on use by "related companies" would be
required to show that he actually exercised control over the
companies." This emphasis on actual control of "related companies"
seemed to be complemented by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit in the case of Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc.96

The owner of registered trademarks for "Dawn" and "Dawn Donut"
sued Hart's Food Stores for infringement resulting from the latter's

unauthorized use of "Dawn" on bakery goods, and Hart's, as
defendant, counterclaimed to cancel plaintiff-owner's registration on
the grounds that the trademark had been abandoned due to the
owner's licensing the mark's use by others. 9 The Second Circuit,
affirming the district court's denial of relief to both parties,9" noted

that the Lanham Act clearly "carries forward" the view that
controlled licensing does not result in abandonment of trademark

rights.99 Emphasizing the importance of control to prevent misuse of
the trademark and deception of the public, the appellate court

asserted that the "critical question" was "whether the plaintiff
sufficiently policed and inspected its licensees' operations to guarantee

the quality of the products they sold under its trademarks to the
public."'' 10 Apparently feeling the trial judge had correctly applied its
C. B. Donald Co., 117 U.S.P.Q. 485 (Comm'r 1958).
Id. The Commissioner specifically mentioned the cases of B.B. & R. Knight, Inc. v. W.L.
Milner & Co., 283 F. 816 (N.D. Ohio 1922), Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513 (8th Cir.
1916), and Keebler Weyl Baking Co. v. J.S. Ivins' Son, 7 F. Supp. 211 (E.D. Pa. 1934).
11117 U.S.P.Q. at 487. The Commissioner stated that "a determination must be made as to
whether or not a mark is used by the applicant-or by someone controlled by the applicant as to
the nature and quality of the goods-to identify his goods and distinguish them from those of
others." Id. (emphasis added).
6 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959).
IId. See note 83 supraand accompanying text.
The plaintiff was denied an injunction against the defendant, the court finding no
likelihood of public confusion since the two parties were operating in separate trading areas with
little likelihood of future overlapping. The defendant's counterclaim was dismissed because the
court found that there had been sufficient control by the plaintiff so that there was no
abandonment. 267 F.2d at 360-61. It is this latter holding which is significant in discussing the
issue of "controlled" licensing.
Id. at 367. The court noted that the pre-Lanham Act cases had been in conflict over the
question of whether "controlled" licensing was permissible, but that the Act had adopted the
view of the cases approving licensing of this nature. Id. at 366-67.
,"IId. at 367.
'
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definition of control, a majority of the Dawn panel sustained the
lower court's finding that the plaintiff had exercised sufficient control
over his licensees, even though the contracts contained no control

provisions, and minimal evidence of actual control was presented. 0'
One judge, however, dissented from the factual holding. 02 While

indicating that contractual control provisions'03 were not essential so
long as sufficient proof of actual control could be presented, he could

not agree that "inspections" made by Dawn's salesmen, apparently
unqualified to inspect, would meet the Act's requirement.'0 4
Both the Commissioner's decision and the Dawn Donut case leave

little doubt but that the Lanham Act requires a licensor actually to
control the nature and quality of goods produced by his licensees.

However, a comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in
Dawn Donut indicates that the Act's initial interpretive difficulties

concerning the extent of control and the scrutiny with which the
courts should examine the exercise of control remain unresolved. In
fact, an examination of case law since the Lanham Act reveals judicial

approval of a wide spectrum of licensing arrangements, ranging from
those involving detailed control provisions to those in which licensee
inspection is made at the licensee's option. ,05

"I1
The contract between Dawn and its licensees did not provide for any quality guarantee of
the goods produced by the licensees, nor were there any provisions granting Dawn a right of
inspection. The only evidence in the trial record as to actual supervision was testimony by two of
Dawn's sales representatives that they regularly visited the licensees and "in many cases" had an
opportunity to inspect and observe their operations. Id. at 368,
11 Id. Although he dissented from the majority's holding on the defendant's counterclaim, the
entire opinion in this case was written by Judge Lumbard, and there is no dissenting opinion
denominated as such. Judge Lumbard dissented from the holding that there was adequate
control on the grounds that the lower court's findings of fact were insufficient for the appellate
court to pass on the question.
,"3Dawn's contracts with its licensees did provide that they were to use the mix sold to them
"as directed and without adulteration," but there was no provision for inspection or
enforcement. id.
01Id. at 368-69. Judge Lumbard concluded that the court "can [not] fairly determine on this
record whether plaintiff subjected its licensees to periodic and thorough inspections by trained
personnel or whether its policing consisted only of chance, cursory examinations of licensees'
operations by technically untrained salesmen. The latter system of inspection hardly constitutes
a sufficient program of supervision to satisfy the requirements of the Act." Id.at 369. Therefore,
he believed the case should be remanded for additional findings on the control issue since the
only evidence in the record was the testimony of Dawn's salesmen. Id.
,osSome of the cases on licensing decided prior to the Lanham Act doubtless found "control"
over a licensee where in fact there was little control exercised, but in general the pre-Lanham Act
cases seem to exhibit a greater concern for the exercise of control and would generally fall on the
side of the spectrum in which there is substantial control. See, e.g., Smith v. Dental Products
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On one end of the spectrum are trademark licensing arrangements specifically including contractual provisions for substantial
control by the licensor.' 6 For example, judicial sanction was obtained for an agreement between a yarn producer and yarn spinners requiring the spinners to produce goods with a minimum number of
stitches per inch and to submit sample goods for extensive testing.'"7
Similarly, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the
Act's control requirements were satisfied by the Celanese Company's licensing agreements which provided that the "Celanese"
trademark would be used only to designate dyestuffs meeting Celanese's quality standard, that Celanese had a right to inspect the
products, and that it could terminate the license on six month's notice.' 8 Such licensing agreements, by specifically providing for quality control standards and rights of inspection, reveal the parties'
compliance with both the letter and spirit of the control requirement,
and the courts have found little difficulty in sustaining such agreements.
Co., 140 F.2d 140, 147 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,322 U.S. 743 (1944); Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett,
238 F. 513, 514-16 (8th Cir. 1916); Crown Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose Corp., 145 F.2d
246 (C.C.P.A. 1944).
It is arguable that in light of modern extended federal supervision and inspection of products,
as done by the Food and Drug Administration, the control requirement need not be so strictly
enforced. There are, however, several objections to such an approach. First, the Lanham Act
requires control, and it is of recent enough vintage that it may be assumed that the control
requirement would not have been included had its authors thought governmental control
adequate. Secondly, there are a large number of products which are not touched by any such
federal regulation as are drugs and certain foods. Finally, such governmental inspection involves
only a minimum standard of purity or wholesomeness and does not extend to any higher level of
quality or excellence with which the consumer may associate the trademark.
' See, e.g., Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 406, 409 (5th Cir.
1962); Heublin, Inc. v. David Sherman Corp., 223 F. Supp. 430,433 (E.D. Mo. 1963), affd, 340
F.2d 377 (8th Cir. 1965); Huntington Nat'l Mattress Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 201 F.
Supp. 938, 944-45 (D. Md. 1962) (dictum). Although not arising under the Lanham Act, an
excellent example of the control which a licensor may exercise over his licensee's products may
be seen in Manischewitz Food Products, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 9 F.R.D. 115 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
10,
Joseph Bancroft & Sons v. Shelley Knitting Mills, Inc., 119 U.S.P.Q. 463, 468 (E.D. Pa.
1958). Bancroft spent an annual sum of $150,000 on its "quality control" program, which
involved the purchasing of goods on the open market to be tested along with samples submitted
by the licensees. Id.; see Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714, 715-16 (D. Kan.

1962).

"IE.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d 484, 486-89
(C.C.P.A. 1948), noted in 49 COLUM. L. REv. 575 (1949). Although the case was decided under
the 1905 Trademark Act, the opinion definitely seems to have been influenced by the passage of
the Lanham Act shortly before.
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Other decisions seem to have required only minimal amounts of
"control" over the licensee's production. For example, adequate
control was found in a licensing system under which a woolen fabrics
manufacturer "controlled" his licensees by selecting clothing
manufacturers of "high quality standards" and by contractually
limiting the use of trademark labels by clothing made from his
fabric." 9 Likewise, a court upheld by implication a licensing
agreement in which a baker's association allowed individual baking
companies to use the name "Sunbeam" on their bread." 0 Although
the control test was theoretically met by the availability of extensive
services to test the ingredients and final products, it appeared that, in
fact, these "control" measures were exercised only at the option of the
individual licensees.'
The case of Land O'Lake Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc
Canning Co." 2 most clearly illustrates judicial approval of a licensing
arrangement which provided very little control. Land O'Lakes, a
marketing cooperative, registered its trademark for dairy products,
although the Oconomowoc company previously had been granted
registration of the same mark for canned goods." 3 Land O'Lakes
subsequently sought to cancel Oconomowoc's registration on the
ground that the latter had abandoned the mark because of a lack of
control over a licensee." 4 Oconomowoc had permitted a grocery
distributor to label certain goods with the "Land O'Lakes" mark,
although the goods were not those of Oconomowoc. The district court
acknowledged that Oconomowoc neither knew in advance the source
of goods to which its licensee attached the mark, nor tested the
" Forstmann Woolen Co. v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 964, 966 (E.D.N.Y. 1950).

However, there seemed to be an absence of effective control, because no provisions permitted the
licensor to inspect or test to determine if his trademark was in fact being properly utilized. Thus,
the case seems distinguishable from pre-Lanham Act cases where the licensor supplied the raw
material but also had substantial means of control. See note 39 supra.
. Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 829 (1958).
' Id. at 949.
221 F. Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1963), affd, 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).
3 It is possible for two companies to register the same trademark if there is no danger of
public deception or confusion, either because the respective products are sufficiently different or

the marketing areas are far enough apart. Id. at 582-83; accord, Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's
Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 364 (2d Cir. 1959).

"1 221 F. Supp. at 577-80. Previous to the instant suit there had been a series of disputes
between the two companies arising out of Oconomowoe's repeated attempts to expand the use of

the trademark to additional products.
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products independently." 5 Nevertheless, the court upheld the validity

of the licensing arrangement and refused to cancel the registration
because the licensee was exercising control over the sources from
which the trademarked goods came and no evidence showed that the
16
quality of the trademarked goods had diminished.
While the range of the control spectrum can be delineated, it

remains difficult to predict whether courts will find a particular
licensing contract within that range. Thus, a number of licensing

arrangements providing for as little control as the Land O'Lakes
license have failed judicial scrutiny. In one case, a fur breeding

association which had register.ed certain trademarks for furs was held
to have forfeited its trademark rights because it had allowed all fur
producers who agreed to market pelts through certain agencies to use

its trademarks on their furs-without providing for any actual control
over the quality of the furs." 7 Even licensing situations similar to
approved pre-Lanham Act cases, such as control by stock ownership,
have been found inadequate." 8 Invalid licensing agreements have not
MId. at 581.
116Id. In sustaining the trial court's finding as to sufficient control, the court of appeals noted
that the name of Oconomowoc appeared on the labels used by the licensee and that during the
40-year duration of the license there had been no complaints as to quality of the licensee's
goods. 330 F.2d at 670. In reaching the conclusion as to valid licensing, both the district court
and the court of appeals seemed to employ a pragmatic test based on the actual results of the
licensing. Thus, since Land O'Lakes seemingly sustained little actual damage as a result of
Oconomowoc's activities, the licensing was upheld. Such an approach seems clearly in conflict with the Lanham Act's requirement that a licensor actually exercise control over his
licensees.
" Midwest Fur Producers Ass'n v. Mutation Mink Breeders Ass'n, 127 F. Supp. 217, 229
(W.D. Wis. 1954). The holding regarding improper licensing was an alternative one; the court
also found that the registration had been improperly granted because the names were generic.
Id.; see American Junior Aircraft Co. v. L.M. Cox Mfg. Co., 107 U.S.P.Q. 260 (S.D. Cal.
1955). In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Imperial Tobacco Co. of Great Britain and Ireland, Ltd., 251 F.
Supp. 362 (E.D. Va. 1965), modified on other grounds, 156 U.S.P.Q. 259 (E.D. Va. 1967),
Philip Morris had acquired the trademark in question from American Tobacco, but the court
held that American did not properly acquire the mark since its relation with the original
trademark owner had been severed as violative of the antitrust laws. Furthermore, the voluntary
exchange of information between Philip Morris and its licensor did not constitute sufficient use
for a "related company" relation. Id. at 379; of. Morse-Starrett Products Co. v. Steccone, 86 F.
Supp. 796 (N.D. Calif. 1949), appealdismissed, 191 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1951).
"I Johnson & Johnson v. Medicraft Pharmacal Co., 130 U.S.P.Q. 373 (Pat. Off. Trademark
Trial & App. Bd. 1961). The Patent Office Trademark Trial and Appeals Board noted that
trademark rights arise out of use and that mere ownership of the capital stock of a corporation
was not, in itself, sufficient to establish a proprietary interest in the trademark since the
stockholder company did not use the mark nor was in any way responsible for the nature and
quality of the goods produced. Id. at 374; see Circus Foods, Inc. v. Frank Herfort Canning Co.,
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been unique to injunction and other court proceedings, for a number
of trademark owners seeking to register their own marks have been

denied registration because their "control" over licensees did not meet
9

Lanham Act standards."
The distinction between cases holding licensing agreements

invalid, and cases such as Land O'Lakes which sustained licenses
providing for similar minimal control seems to be the extent to which

the courts have examined actual control. Cases in which the licensing
did not pass judicial scrutiny often turned on a lack of effective
exercise of control, even though there may have been adequate
provisions for control.'2 ° However, judicial inquiry as to whether
substantial control was in fact exercised by a licensor is unusual;

indeed, in most cases courts either have examined only contractual
control provisions'' or have required only very minimal actual
control. 2 Judicial reluctance to consider the question of substantial
actual control is a distinctive feature of cases decided since the
Lanham Act. Even though the leading case of Dawn Donut clearly

indicated that actual control is necessary in a valid trademark licensing agreement, the only critical examination of actual control was
made by the dissenting judge, the majority giving wide latitude to
110 U.S.P.Q. 501 (Comm'r 1956) (alternative holding). However, the pre-Lanham Act cases
which approved licensing arrangements between companies connected by stock ownership also
found additional "control" measures present. See notes 43-45 supra.
"I In Celanese Corp. of America, 136 U.S.P.Q. 86, 87-88 (Pat. Off. Trademark Trial & App.
Bd. 1962), Celanese was denied registration of a trademark for a plastic which was used on toys
because of insufficient control over the toy producers. This case seems very similar to preLanham Act cases where the licensor supplied the raw material and exercised some control. See
notes 36-40 supra. The fact that registration was denied is probably a function of the Patent
Office's strict requirement that proof of actual control be demonstrated.See Dan River Mills,
Inc., 109 U.S.P.Q. 68 (Comm'r 1956); Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. 19 (Comm'r 1953) (dictum);
Baxter Laboratories, Inc. v. Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122 (Comm'r 1950), modified on
other grounds, 186 F.2d 511 (C.C.P.A. 1951); cf. Illini Dairy Queen, Inc. v. McCullough's
Dairy Queen, 115 U.S.P.Q. 18 (Comm'r 1957) (dictum); Jongleux and Lundquist, Inc., 101
U.S.P.Q. 77 (Comm'r 1954). See notes 127-28 infra and accompanying text.
"'See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Imperial Tobacco Co. of Great Britain and Ireland Ltd.,
251 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Va. 1965); Celanese Corp. of America, 136 U.S.P.Q. 86 (Pat. Off.
Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1962); Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. 19 (Comm'r 1953); Baxter
Laboratories, Inc. v. Don Baxter, Inc., 87 U.S.P.Q. 122 (Comm'r 1950), modified on other
grounds, 186 F.2d 511 (C.C.P.A. 1951); cf Circus Foods, Inc. v. Frank Herfort Canning Co.,
110 U.S.P.Q. 501 (Comm'r 1956) (alternative holding).
1 See, e.g., Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714, 715-16 (D. Kan. 1962).
" See, e.g., Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 829 (1958); Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F.
Supp. 576 (E.D. Wis. 1963), affd, 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).

Vol. 1968: 875]

TRA DEMARK LICENSING

the trial court's limited findings.'23 Furthermore, a number of other
post-Lanham Act licensing arrangements would clearly have satisfied the control requirement if they had been in fact enforced. For
example, ice cream franchise contracts usually require use of specific
formulas and special auxiliary products, prohibitions against serving
certain foods, and rights of inspection and product testing by the licensor. However, courts have not inquired whether these controls
were utilized.12 ' Such reluctance is made more significant by the fact
that when the inquiry has been conducted, the control has been found
inadequate'-23-thus suggesting that the real purpose of the Lanham
Act's control requirement is not being fulfilled. Furthermore, Senate hearings have revealed that there may be widespread evasion of
the control requirement in modern licensing.' -6
Thus, post-Lanham Act precedents reasonably suggest that some
"recital" of control over the licensee generally will be sufficient to
protect a trademark licensor whose ownership is challenged in an infringement suit or other proceeding. However, the Commissioner of
Patents has made it quite clear that an applicant seeking to registera
trademark on the basis of use by a "related company" will have to
show more than contractual provisions for control.' According to the
Commissioner, such an applicant should be required to furnish "docuDawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 367-68 (2d Cir. 1959).
" See Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 332 F.2d 505
(2d Cir. 1964); Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714, 715-16 (D. Kan. 1962); Medd
v. Boyd Wagner, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 399, 402-03 (N.D. Ohio 1955). For other cases in which the
courts have ignored the issue of actual control see Drexel Enterprises, Inc. v. American
Heritage, Inc., 142 U.S.P.Q. 194 (D. Conn. 1964); Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp.,
214 F. Supp. 664 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affd, 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913
(1965); Forstmann Woolen Co. v. J.W. Mays, Inc., 89 F. Supp. 964 (E.D.N.Y. 1950); E.I.
DuPont DeNemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d 484 (C.C.P.A. 1948); cf
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963); George A.
Hormel & Co. v. Hereford Heaven Brands, Inc., 341 F.2d 158 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
"ISee notes 117-18 supra. There seem to be no definite underlying factors which determine
the extent to which courts examine control requirements. The nature or size of the industry or
similar factors seem to play no part. Instead, it seems that the extent of the inquiry will be
determined by the particular court's conception of the need or desirability of looking beyond the
basic contractual arrangements.
"I Hearingson S. 1396 Before the Subcomm. on Patents,Trademarks, and Copyrights of the
Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). S. 1396 provided, in part, for a more
complete registration of trademarks involving use by "related companies" whereby licensees
would be identified and registered, a description of the relationship given, and the methods of
control used by the licensor disclosed. Id. at 8. The assertion about evasion of the control
requirement was made by former Assistant Commissioner of Patents, Leeds. Id. at 6.
"' Pure Oil Co., 99 U.S.P.Q. 19 (Comm'r 1953) (dictum).
'

4
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mentary evidence. . . or a clear and concise verified explanation of
the type or method and the extent of the control exercised." ' The

Patent Office's strict attitude toward the necessity of control, coupled
with the laxity of some courts in ascertaining actual control in licensing agreements, creates a double standard about the amount of
control required which is somewhat analogous to the situation after
the United States Steel decision. '21 The extensive showing of control
required in order to register a trademark is often greater than the
control which must be shown by a trademark owner seeking to protect
his common law trademark rights from infringement.1 0 As a result, the difficulty of registering a trademark may outweigh the advantages of such action, and the Lanham's Act's purpose of encouraging registration may be significantly impaired."'

Another problem which hampers proper supervision of licensing
arrangements registered under the Lanham Act is whether the burden
of proof on the issue of improper licensing should be allocated to the

party challenging the licensing arrangement or to the party whose
licensing is challenged. Requiring basically a showing of inadequate
control,' the improper licensing question arises in every type of
trademark proceeding. Currently, placement of the burden apparently
varies with the type of proceeding involved.' In a proceeding in which
2

I Id. at

20-21. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and the statement of the

Commissioner was dictum intended to guide the examiner in making further findings. However,
it seems the Commissioner was taking the opportunity to express clearly the policy of the Patent
Office with regard to trademark licensing. Moreover, other decisions of the Commissioner
indicate that a showing of actual control is required. See, e.g., Celanese Corp. of America, 136
U.S.P.Q. 86 (Pat. Off. Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1962); C.B. Donald Co., 117 U.S.P.Q. 485
(Comm'r 1958).
" See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
1o See note 56 supra and accompanying text. It would appear obvious that effective
enforcement of the Lanham Act requires a common approach to the "control" concept by both
the courts and the Patent Office. The failure of some courts to enforce a strict control
requirement undercuts the basic premise of licensing and creates the possibility of consumer
deception in relying on "false" trademarks. See note 131 infra and accompanying text.
"I See notes 60-63 supra and accompanying text. Discouraging the registration of trademarks
would seemingly result in an increased number of trademark licensing situations which would
not be subject to an outside examination. The apparent result of this would be increased
opportunity for abusing the licensing arrangement and, therefore, for further public deception
and loss of confidence in trademarks generally.
" The cases do not deal with the question of what standard of proof must be met to sustain
the burden on the issue of control. However, it seems reasonable that in an infringement case,
which is a civil action, the traditional preponderance of the evidence test would be applied.
Where the question is registration, it may be concluded that the same standard is to be met.
" See Krayer, Domestic Trademark Licensing, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 574,578-79 (1961).
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an applicant seeks to register a trademark by relying on use by
"related companies," the applicant must establish the adequacy of his
control over licensees.' 34 Secondly, a party who opposes an
application and seeks to establish his own rights in a trademark
through use by related companies must sustain the burden on the issue
of whether the licensing is proper.'35 As a corollary, if the party
opposing an application only asserts that the applicanthas engaged in
improper licensing and is, therefore, not entitled to registration, the
opponent bears the ultimate responsibility for proof.'36 A third
context in which the issue of improper licensing may be presented
occurs when the defendant in an infringement suit contends that the
owner is precluded from suing because he has "abandoned" his
trademark rights by failing to control his licensees.'37 In this posture,
lack of control is an affirmative defense, which the non-owner
defendant must establish.'38 Finally, a party seeking to have another's
trademark registration cancelled on the ground of "abandonment"
through improper licensing carries the burden of proof on the issue.'39
Placing the burden of proving adequate control on an applicant
for registration and on a party who opposes a registration
application by asserting his own trademark rights on the basis of use
by licensees is acceptable, since a party who seeks the benefits of
Lanham Act registration seems properly required to show that he is
entitled to them. However, to place this entire burden on a defendant in
an infringement suit or on a party who opposes a registration
application by asserting that the applicant engages in improper
licensing raises difficult problems. Its consequence is to restrict an
otherwise effective method of enforcing the Lanham Act's
'-See Joseph Bancroft & Sons, 129 U.S.P.Q. 329 (Pat. Off. Trademark Trial & App. Bd.
1961); Jongleux and Lundquist, Inc., 101 U.S.P.Q. 77 (Comm'r 1954).
"'See Sealey, Inc. v. Simmons Co., 265 F.2d 934, 936 (C.C.P.A. 1959); Bellbrook Dairies,
Inc. v. Hawthorn-Melody Farms Dairy, Inc., 253 F.2d 431 (C.C.P.A. 1958) (by implication);
Tetra Pak Co. v. Schneider, 125 U.S.P.Q. 460 (Pat. Off. Trademark Trial & App. Bd. 1960);
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. A. Bruene & Co., 115 U.S.P.Q. 24 (Comm'r 1957).
116 Cf James, Pond and Clark, Inc. v. R.H. Baker & Co., 128 U.S.P.Q. 262 (Pat. Off.
Trademark Trial& App. Bd. 1961).
'"See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
"'Sterling Drug Inc. v. Lincoln Laboratories, Inc., 322 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1963); American
Foods, Inc. v. Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619, 624-25 (5th Cir. 1963); Dawn Donut Co. v.
Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 368 (2d Cir. 1959); cf. R.C.W., Supervisor, Inc. v.
Cuban Tobacco Co., 220 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
"' See E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d 484, 487-89
(C.C.P.A. 1948); Land O'Lakes Creameries, Inc. v. Oconomowoc Canning Co., 221 F. Supp.
576 (E.D. Wis. 1963), affd, 330 F.2d 667 (7th Cir. 1964).
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requirement of control, because parties challenging the trademark's

validity-the only ones likely to raise the improper licensing
issue-are not favorably positioned to prove that such licensing has
actually occurred.' 40 On the other hand, the Lanham Act gives a

registered mark prima facie validity, 4' which should include insulation
from specious charges of improper licensing. Thus, some accommoda-

tion must be reached between the Act's requirement of control and its
goal of encouraging registration. The present allocation of the proof

burden, however, along with the general reluctance of courts to examine the issue of actual control, 4 2 effectively undercuts the Lanham Act's control requirement.' 43 Therefore, it is reasonable to con-

clude that the right to challenge improper licensing has become
largely illusory-a conclusion supported by the paucity of cases in-

validating trademark rights on the basis of inadequate control by a
licensor.

44

140The Patent Office does not independently investigate trademark licensing, and the issue is
only raised in some formal proceeding. In registrationproceedings, the Office clearly does all it
can in requiring an applicant to demonstrate his "control" procedures. However, in an
adversary proceeding the issue must necessarily be raised by the opposing party. While such
adversaries may often have some knowledge about improper licensing, it is doubtful that they
will often have sufficiently detailed information to carry a burden of proving that improper
licensing has, in fact, occurred.
't See note 63 supraand accompanying text.
, See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
' Thus, under present judicial trends in trademark licensing, the Lanham Act's control
requirement is significantly hampered in two different ways. Apparently, a mere "recital" of
control in a licensing agreement will ordinarily protect a trademark owner's rights and foreclose
an opposing party from proving a lack of control. However, even were the courts to examine
actual control, if the burden of proof was placed on the party opposing the trademark licensor,
the improper licensing issue generally would remain foreclosed due to the difficulty of proving
improper licensing.
I" See notes 117-18 supra and accompanying text. One problem, beyond the scope of this
comment, which may arise in trademark licensing is a possible conflict with the antitrust laws.
Thus, the arrangement between a licensor and licensees may involve a sufficient merger of assets
to substantially lessen competition in violation of section 7 of the ClaytonAct, 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1964). However, it has been suggested that the amount of control over a licensee will not be the
crucial fact in determining if a violation exists, but that the determination will turn on such
factors as the strength of the trademark and the market situation in which it competes. See
Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE L.J. 1171,
1194-97 (1963). Licensing arrangements, particularly those of a franchise nature, may also
restrict a licensee from engaging in certain competitive practices and thus run afoul of section 3
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964), and section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1964). Such arrangements as "tie-in" agreements, territorial divisions, and price maintenance
may be particularly vulnerable to attack on these grounds. However, while licensing of
trademarks is clearly not exempted from the antitrust laws, recent court decisions have indicated
that certain practices which are a legitimate part of a licensing agreement may be employed,
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CONCLUSION

The Lanham Act clearly requires that in order to obtain the
benefits of registration under the Act, a trademark licensor must
exercise control over the nature and quality of the goods produced by
his licensees. This requirement is necessary to effectuate the
trademark's "guaranty" that the product on which it appears is of a
certain quality and that the public will not be deceived in relying on
the "guaranty." Although the control requirement must necessarily
be enforced to a large extent by voluntary compliance by trademark
licensors and their licensees and by competition among rival
trademark owners in the same field, the courts retain an important
role. The courts should vigorously insist that a licensor actually
control his licensees, in order to protect the rights of the litigants and
to encourage all licensors to observe the control standard. Greater
judicial insistence on actual control in licensing would not only
diminsh the opportunity for public deception resulting from the use of
the same trademark on goods of different quality, but would result in
continued, and perhaps expanded, confidence in trademarks
generally. Both consequences were prime objectives of the Lanham
45
Act.1
Furthermore, enforcing the control concept would require no
particular expertise on the part of the courts, and the reasonable
measures of supervision could be judically ascertained with minimal
difficulty. While the great majority of "control" measures would vary
with the product and industry involved,' 46 several measures would
appear necessary in most licensing situations. One such measure
would be product testing by the licensor.' 47 Another standard control
although they would perhaps violate the laws if used in other situations. See Denison Mattress
Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp.
636 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). See generally Timberg, Trade-Marks, Monopoly, and the Restraint of
Competition, 14 LAW &CONTEMP. PROB. 323 (1949); Note, 72 YALE L. J. supra.

'"See note 60 supra and accompanying text.
1,6 For example, the necessary control measures in franchised operations, such as ice cream,
generally include production according to formulas, use of standardized goods and materials,
and supervised advertising. See, e.g., Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714, 715-16
(D. Kan. 1962). Certain products may need to pass a resiliency or strength test. See, e.g., In re
Celanese Corp. of America, 136 U.S.P.Q. 86, 87-88 (Pat. Off. Trademark Trial &App. Bd.
1962).
"' The type of testing, of course, would vary with the industry. In the clothing industry the test
might be the number of stitches per inch in the garment, see Joseph Bancroft &Sons. v. Shelley
Knitting Mills, Inc., 119 U.S.P.Q. 463, 468 (E.D. Pa. 1958), as well as other tests, see Crown
Fabrics Corp. v. American Viscose Corp., 145 F.2d 246, 247 (C.C.P.A. 1944). Requiring
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measure would be a system for quickly terminating the licensing
arrangement upon violation by the licensee. 4 ' Finally, the licensor

should make certain inspections of the licensees' premises and
business operations, a control measure now found in many licensing
agreements. 49 The difficulty in judicially checking the use of these
control measures is certainly no greater than the courts face in cases

involving other modern business intricacies.' 0
Moreover, to make the Act's "guaranty" theory work properly,
the burden of proof on lack of control should be modified so that it
will no longer present an obstacle to challenging improper licensing.
The solution to this burden of proof problem, however, does not lie in

changing the burden so that a party who merely alleges that improper
licensing has taken place may force his licensor-opponent to disprove

improper licensing by showing control over his licensees. In addition
to being inconsistent with the Lanham Act's granting of prima facie
1alidity to a registered mark,' such an approach would only cause
the question of improper licensing to be raised as a matter of course in
many licensing cases in which it need not be an actual issue. A

reasonable alternative solution would be to shift the burden to the
party who is alleged to have failed to control his licensees if some

evidence of this is introduced or if there are reasonable grounds to
believe that such a lack of control has occurred.

foodstuffs to pass certain ingredient or taste tests would be a natural control measure. See
Manischewitz Food Products, Inc. v. Rosenberg, 9 F.R.D. 115, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1949).
"'See Adam v. Folger, 120 F. 260 (7th Cir. 1903); Vermont Maple Syrup Co. v. F.N.
Johnson Maple Syrup Co., 272 F. 478 (D. Vt. 1921). While some type of physical control over
trademark labels would be most desirable, this would probably prove impractical in many cases.
However, if the licensing agreement clearly provided that the use of the trademark was to seize
upon certain contingencies, including disputes between licensor and licensee, the licensor would
seemingly be in a more favorable position to obtain injunctive relief, if it were necessary.
"'See, e.g., Smith v. Dental Products Co., 140 F.2d 140, 145-46 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 322
U.S. 743 (1944); Coca-Cola Co. v. Bennett, 238 F. 513, 514-15 (8th Cir. 1916); E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co. v. Celanese Corp. of America, 167 F.2d 484, 486-87 (C.C.P.A. 1948). A
periodic inspection of the licensee's facilities, particularly important where sanitary production
is required, would seem to be an effective control measure in all licensing situations. Such
inspections would surely make licensees in general more aware of their responsibilities, as well as
providing a means for detecting individual violators of the licensing agreement.
'so
Courts have not hesitated to make inquiries into technical practices and procedures in
various industries. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262 (S.D.N.Y.
1966); Eustis Mining Co. v. Beer, Sondheimer & Co., 239 F. 976 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).
"' See note 63 supra and accompanying text.

